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Abstract
Nepal made signicant progress in removing monarchy and terrors of Maoists
in the last decade. It however lacks a stable solution for speedier economic
growth and development as the major political parties are still struggling to
institutionalize the new political framework set up by the new constitution of
Nepal that was promulgated by the Constitution Assembly of Nepal (CAN-II
) for the federal democratic republic of Nepal on 20 September 2015. Nepalese
economy crippled by the terrible earthquake of April 2015 got further para-
lyzed by the undeclared blockade from India that was afraid of separatist move-
ments in southern Nepal. NC led government managed to conduct free and
fair elections of central, provincial and local governments by the end of 2017
in which the NCP, a new allaince of communist CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist
parties was able to secure the absolute majority based on radical manifesto
promises relegating the NC to a weak opposition. The NCP government has
however failed totally to implement its promises in practice bringing inclusive
programmes suitable to multi-ethnic, multi-climatic and multi-cultural and
multi-linguistic economy and society. Corruption has spread further from the
top to the bottom. Quality of institutions, leadership and the governance has
further deteriorated. Faster growth and economic growth and development is
not possible unless the new system sticks to a dynamic model for a decentral-
ized economy updating beliefs that can improve the wellbeing of people and
transform Nepal into a modern, vibrant, and market oriented dynamic econ-
omy. Nepal should avoid economically and topographically unrealistic trans-
I take full responsibility for any issues that may arise due to opinions expressed in
this paper.Address: Business School, University of Hull, HU6 7RX, Hull, UK;email:
K.R.Bhattarai@hull.ac.uk.
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Himalayan trade-e¤orts with China and should improve mutual and natural
understanding and cooperation with India to sustain growth in the long run.
Keywords: constitution, institution, Nepal, economic growth and develop-
ment
JEL classication: O5, P5
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1 Introduction
The Second Constituent Assembly of Nepal (CAN - II) promulgated a new consti-
tution for the federal republic of Nepal on September 20, 2015. Six years had gone
in negotiations without any agreements or consensus. A major earthquake on April
26, 2015 with loss of more than 8400 lives and massive collateral damages and out-
pouring of supports from India, China and other countries and non-resident Nepalis
proved to be a turning point.
New constitution was voted for by 507 members of the CAN-II and voted against
by 25 members and abstained by 66 members from the Tarai-Madesh region who were
in agitation already protesting the early draft of it that was circulated for public re-
actions. This constitution proposes a multiparty federal decentralized parliamentary
system with three levels of Governance in Nepal: a centre, seven provinces and lo-
cal assemblies (460 villages, 276 municipalities, 11 sub-Metropolis, six Metropolitan
cities and 77 districts). The lower house of parliament, the Pratinidhi Sabha is made
of 275 members, of which 165 are directly elected from parliamentary constituencies
on the FPTP basis and 110 members elected according to the proportional represen-
tation. The upper house is made of 59 members, eight from each of seven provinces,
another three nominated by the president from specialists in various elds to repre-
sent the national interest, at least one to be a female. The Prime Minister is elected
by the parliament on the basis of majority voting, the council of ministers is jointly
responsible to the parliament, the PM selects members of his cabinet.
When a single party cannot claim a majority in the parliament a coalition of
parties is formed for the majority of votes based on power sharing agreement between
them. The President and the Vice President are elected by the parliament. Then this
constitution has a provision of an independent judiciary in order to check and balance
the exercise of power by the legislative and executive bodies. In addition there
are twelve di¤erent national level commissions to provide special duties including
the election commission for the election of central, provincial and local bodies, a
commission for abuse of authorities in public o¢ ces, a commission for human rights,
a commission to recruit o¢ cials for public services, and several other commissions
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to look after the special interest of women, ethnic groups including Madesh, Dalits,
Muslims and Tharu communities.
Constitution with 37 sections, 297 clauses and 7 schedules - all in 128 pages
provides more than 30 fundamental rights for individuals aiming to protect their
political , economic, social and cultural interests. Preamble states commitment to
overall welfare based on social justice for all citizens. The broad directive princi-
ples of political, economic, cultural, dalits and marginal groups and females guide
activities of the nation. Most important aspect of this constitution is that this is the
rst time when a modern constitution is written and promulgated by the delegates
directly elected by people of Nepal. In this sense this should be considered as the
end of feudalism and a beginning of the democratic socialism in Nepal. People were
struggling for this moment continuously for seven decades since 1940.
The major political parties the Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal
- United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) and United Communist Party of Nepal-
Moist (UCPN-M) were able to forge a consensus among the four major issues in
July 2015. Lack of this had caused total failure of the CAN-I after four yearsof its
tenure on May 28, 20121. Four issues that took so much attention were :
1. Restructuring of state: what should be the number of provinces and what
should be their names in the federal democratic system of Nepal?
2. Form of the governance: should it be a presidential or parliamentary form of
the polity?
3. Election system: should representatives of people be elected on the basis pro-
portional representation system or on the basis of the rst pass the post (FPTP)
election system or a combination of both? What should be timings of elections?
4. Justice system: what should be its form and how to insure its independence?
1When the members of the Maoists led coalition of opposition parties protested violently in the
assemby on Jan 22, 2015, it was clear their intention was not for a solution of the current problem but
to create chaos, tensions and disruptions. It seemed that they still had not transformed themselves
the basic priciples of democracy but still cotinue to day-dreaming of a totalitarian system with their
full control of all parts of the government.
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The deadlock created by "the mutual distrusts, lack of su¢ cient home-works
and over concentration on negative criticism to disrupt any good initiative" broke
because of the urgent need for speedy economic recovery in the wake of outpouring of
international assistance for the victims of the April 2015 earthquake. Thus a massive
natural shock united most of the political forces towards a new constitution.
It must be noted that outright non-acceptance by the Madesh based parties raised
fears of separatist movements which further led to a ve month long undeclared em-
bargo by India. This not only slowed down the process of demarcation of provinces,
election of provincial assemblies and government, election of the national govern-
ment in Nepal but shattered its condence in setting up strategies for growth and
development in Nepal with the multiparty structure with focus on broader objec-
tives of national development, alleviation of poverty and speedier economic growth.
Nepal should avoid economically and topographically unrealistic trans-Himalayan
trade-e¤orts with China and should improve mutual and natural understanding and
cooperation with India to sustain growth in the long run.
1.1 Realities
Nepal is a very heterogeneous country not only in terms of rugged topography and
ethnographic landscape with Mountains, Hills, Valleys and Tarai regions but dif-
ferent ethnic group settlements concentrated in di¤erent parts of the country. The
current structure of unied Nepal originated in "baise-chaubise rajya -(22 and 24
principalities)" before the unication of modern Nepal around 1769. Ethnic groups
such as Limbuwan, Bhojpuri-Mithila, Sherpa, Newa, Awadh, Magarat, Khas Arya,
Tharuhat, Dotel retain their identity and culture in specic regions. Had the new
federal Nepal, been divided in provinces on the basis of ethnicity, it would have
created new problems or even led to civil wars as di¤erent groups could enter into
conict in sharing natural resources including rivers, forests and mountains.
Nepal should learn something from the referendum for independence of Scotland
in September 2014. The whole nation can disintegrate if provinces want political
independence. It will certainly be di¢ cult for Nepal to achieve faster growth rate in
the rest of the 21st century with discontents among sub-national groups. Provinces
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Provinces Capital Districts Area (km²) Population 2011 Density (people/km²) Total LMP People per LMP People per CMP Federal Seats
Province No. 1 Biratnagar 14 25,905 4,534,943 175 93 48,763 161,962 28
Province No. 2 Janakpur 8 9,661 5,404,145 559 107 50,506 168,880 32
Province No. 3 Hetauda 13 20,300 5,529,452 272 110 50,268 167,559 33
Gandaki Pokhara 11 21,504 2,403,757 112 60 40,063 133,542 18
Province No. 5 Butwal 12 22,288 4,499,272 219 87 51,716 173,049 26
Karnali Surkhet 10 27,984 1,570,418 41 40 39,260 130,868 12
Sudurpashchim Godawari 9 19,539 2,552,517 130 53 48,161 159,532 16
in federal Nepal may not have decentralized political and economic power as intended
but will create extra problems and tensions and misuse of scarce economic resources.
While the decentralization aims to empower ordinary citizens in making decisions
about their daily lives at local level, there is a danger that they may be drawn
into unnecessary conicts if such divisions are not according to economic realities.
Decentralization has been successful in many advanced countries. The model of
decentralization in the Western Europe, particularly of Switzerland, shows how the
decisions taken by elected assemblies in provinces are far superior to those taken in
the capital city. Decisions relating to the provision of basic public services including
education, health and provision of water, electricity, gas, or developing literature,
culture and traditions are more e¢ cient at the local level within the broad parameters
set by the central government. Local elected assemblies are closer to the people.
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Figure 1: Seven provinces and ethnicity in Nepal
How many provinces should a federal Nepal had have? As shown in Figure 1
the new constitution has declared creation of seven provinces. Smaller states cannot
attract larger investments required for speedier growth. Therefore it is better to
be very cautious about the number of states. It is important to understand that
the size of markets become important in reaping the scale and scope and realising
protability of investment projects. Administrative cost multiplies with the number
of states. Number of states was one of the most contentious issues, still not settled
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issue, among the political parties. Maoists party opting for ten to eleven provinces
and others for ve to seven. They were able to compromise on Seven. The bound-
aries of provinces, metropolis, or town or village municipalities were determined by
the Federal Commission eventually by June 2017 local elections. Names capital of
provinces 1, 2, 3 and 5 are yet to be decided.
Compare the size of states in India and provinces in China. Total population of
Nepal (now in about 30 million) is about 14.6 percent of the Uttar Pradesh (224.5
million), 29.1 percent of Bihar (104 million) and 32.2 percent of the West Bengal (91
million) in India. Similarly Guangdong (105.9 ml), Sandong (96.9 ml), Henan (94.1
ml) and Sinchuan (85 ml) provinces of China have population more than three times
of entire Nepal. Size of population in Tibet of 3.1 ml is about 10 percent of Nepal.
Dividing the markets for goods and services and factors of production in Nepal in
less than four million people does not seem economically prudent.
Why should the form of governance matter so much? Nepals neighbor India has
a very successful parliamentary system and China is doing very well economically
under the presidential system. The United States is a good example of presidential
system and the UK is a very successful parliamentary democracy. The separation
of power and functions among the legislative, executive and the judiciary is working
well in all of these democratic countries no matter under the presidential or parlia-
mentary system. Given the heterogeneity of population, it seems optimal to choose
the parliamentary democracy system in Nepal to decentralise power more than in
a presidential system. What matters for stability is clear jurisdictions among the
wings of the government in the centre and in among the provinces, towns, villages
and their wards. Individuals should know their roles, responsibilities and limitations
clearly while being part of the nation. Above all honesty and integrity of the elected
leaders is the most important determinant of the quality of these institutions without
which it is impossible to ght against corruption that has been the major stumbling
block in promoting growth in Nepal.
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1.1.1 Structure of the Parliament
As has been seen in the last two elections for CAN-I and CAN-II, electoral system
remains combinations of the rst pass the post (FPTP) and the proportional election
system. No vote is wasted in such mixed election system; it is immune for the para-
dox of median voters. The parliament now consists of the House of Representatives
(lower house) and the National Assembly (upper house). Lower house is made of
275 members, of which 165 are directly elected from parliamentary constituencies on
the FPTP basis and 110 members elected according to the proportional represen-
tation. This number is about 35 percent above the 205 member parliament elected
on May 12, 1991. Then the upper house has 59 members, eight from each of seven
provinces, another three nominated by the president from specialists in various elds
to represent the national interest including at least one female nominee. This way
each parliamentarian represents about 1.3 to 1.7 lakh people. This may be a very
a¤ordable parliament that can focus on promulgating rules and regulations required
to run the country particularly for the speedier economic growth. It also provides
su¢ cient numbers to the cabinet and committees in the parliament at the central
level and for committees at the local bodies. In theory the parliament should elect
the most capable person as the president on a non-partisan basis who is responsible
for all people equally. He should have some emergency and contingency powers to
defend the state. This sort of arrangement could work very well also in Nepal as it
has worked so well in India.
1.1.2 Electoral system and Judiciary
There is little room for any controversy about the nature and functions of the election
commission. Its main function is to arrange smooth and fair election and prepare
list of voters and candidates. Its major duties include maintaining the accuracy of
the voterslist and checking the credentials of candidates claiming to represent the
people, count votes and declare winners and losers on the basis of votes they are able
to secure in the election.
The major function of a judiciary, made of the one Supreme Court, Seven High
Courts and 77 District Courts is to ensure the system of justice in the country. Judges
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of the Supreme Court have plaid very important roles in defending democracy in
Nepal. From time to time since 1990 independent judiciary has protected democracy
in Nepal when the political agreements were collapsing bringing the whole country in
the darkness. Government of bureaucrats was much more e¢ cient than the elected
ones in conducting free and fair general election for CAN-II on November 19, 2013.
The parliament of Nepal was reinstated in 2006 by a decision of the Supreme Court;
the government led by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court conducted successful
election for CAN-II when the CAN-I was dissolved without drafting a constitution.
There should be no doubt that judiciary should be independent and run by the
professionals so that it can break deadlocks when the parliament is hung and the
political parties cannot reach any decisions.
1.1.3 National Consensus
Each of the above four issues did not become very complicated to reach into a
national agreement when the political parties became keen in promoting the welfare
and development of common people. Apparently di¤erent ideological positions of
these political parties that were behind controversies and the power struggle were
set aside. Trust among each other and true will and sense of urgency for the national
development from political parties after the earthquake was phenomenal. Every
person thinks that had the rst priority been to form a consensus of all parties for
the new constitution, Nepal could already have moved many miles in process of
growth and development. Major political parties NC and UML with 64.1 percent
votes in the in CAN-II made compromises with the Maoists that had only 14.3 votes
to bypass each other. Being in colation with an arch-enemy proved very costly to
the NC in the rst general election under the new constitution in 2017.
Consensus on the major goals and objectives of development is the best solution
as it can be expected to initiate an era of credible and cooperative relations among
the major political forces and to bring the ultimate political stability required for
the speedier growth process in Nepal. It is irony that the whole system has become
very fragile, ine¢ cient, corrupt and unreliable after NCP won the absolute majority
in 2017 election. While the merger of Maoists with the UML was seen as a good
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sign in the beginning but the new Oli government has failed to live up to the true
spirit of democratic movement and performed far below the peoples expectation.
Frustration has widened and trust has been broken from the ability of government
to steer the growth process. Private sector is clueless or whole nation is operated by
coterie of dons and phychofants. Quality of leadership is very low and its ability to
make decisions is very much reduced because of internal conicts among the main
personalities running the party. Lack of security and foot-dragging mentality is
making the system more opaque devoid of transparency required for the successful
functioning of the democracy. NC in the opposition is also very weak for similar
reasons. Thus the dreams of Nepalese people are unfullled and great dissatisfaction
is around every sector or sections of the economy or public life. Such situation
most be corrected to bring Nepal into track of speedier growth and development.
This can be possible by adopting a more scientic way of decision making based
on objective analysis of facts and gures and with proper appreciation of alternative
views before nding an optimal strategy, programme or projects required for balanced
development of the country. Theory and empirical sides should be analysed clearly.
2 A Theory of Disagreements
The major concern of the majority in Nepal is economic development. Gaps in per
capital GDP in PPP between Nepal, its neighbors China and India and advanced
nations such as the UK and USA in gure 2 and Table 1 are huge. How long does
it take to bridge these gaps depends on how fast Nepal grows compared to these
countries. For instance, assuming the UK continues to growth 2.5 percent per year
it will take 129 year to catch up to the income level of the UK if Nepal continues
to growth 5 percent but only 26 years if it grows by 15 percent (Figure 3). High
growth rate is possible in Nepal by educating the young population as Nepal has the
greatest possibility of releasing population dividend as it has the highest share of
0-14 years to total population as shown in Figure 4. Further more millions of young
people need to go abroad for education and employment. Remittances constitute
about 29 percent of GDP a lot higher than any other countries as shown in Figure
7. Nepals import to GDP ratio has risen steeply to above 35 percent now from
11
year as a share of GDP (Figure 5), this has created large current account decit
and required continuos depreciation of Nepali Rupee against the US dollar and other
international currencies (Figure 6). Private sector enterprises have not ourished
and are unable to increase the rate of investment despite plenty of opportunities in
basic industries such as hydro-energy, tourism, education, health and communication.
Nepal is among the least developed countries in the world not because she does not
have enough resources but because these are not utilized properly. In the last three
hundred years till 1950, it was completely feudalistic state cut o¤ from the world.
Some incremental steps for modern growth started then but these were very minimal
and beset by the political instability mainly due to conicts between the interest
of the rulers and common people. After the dissolution of parliament in 1960 due
to conict of interest between then king and popularly elected BP Koirala, about
30 years till 1990 were under the direct rule by the king and his deputies under
the extractive and extortionary system. Reinstatement of parliamentary system in
1990 re-established the process of inclusive growth that was terminated in 1960 but
it could not be stable and was disrupted by Maoist conicts and wars along with
the royal coup and take-over of peoples power by the King in 2002. He dissolved
the parliament in 2002 and imposed direct rule till he was forced to relinquish all
his power by 21 day popular revolution in April 2006. This was possible because of
the joint alliance of NC, CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist parties in that glorious April
2006 revolution.2 Such agreement disappeared in the next eight years of intense
negotiations for peace and constitution. Nepal has entered into the new phase of
federal republic after the promulgation of this new constitution in September 2015.
2The King relinquished all powers that he had snatched away from the people by reinstating
the House of Representatives (HOR) on the eve of 20th day of protest on 25 April, 2006 organised
under the joint initiatives of all political parties including the Maoists. This historic revolution in
Nepal swept away the institution of monarchy for good. Then the CAN-I was elected with 601
members on May 28, 2008 and CAN-II on Nov 22, 2013.
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Figure 2: Per Capital income in PPP (Data source: IMF WEO)
Figure 3: How many years will it take Nepal to catch up to the UK
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Table 1: Di¤erence in per capita GDP in 2012 (in 2005 dollars) and corresponding
percapita GDP in PPP dollars
Per capita GDP in 2012 US$ Per capita GDP in PPP $
EU 100 ($28748) 100 ($27818)
USA 157.7 163.0
UK 131.5 117.4
Australia 129.8 128.2
South Africa 20.9 35.4
Brazil 19.9 36.9
China 11.6 28.6
India 3.9 12.0
Nepal 1.4 4.6
Niger 1.0 2.4
Burundi 0.5 1.7
Figure 4: Ratio of young 0-14 years people to total population
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Figure 5: Import to GDP ration in percent
Figure 6: Exchange rates: national curreny per US dollar
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Figure 7: Remittance to GDP ratios
2.1 End of the Game of Emperors New Clothes
Politicians are playing a sort of emperors new cloth game with the people in Nepal;
rst while writing and promulgating the constitution and now by pretending to im-
plement it3. First reason for a stalemate is the lack of trust and credibility among
members of the political parties. It is true that Nepal is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual
country with spread in Mountains, Hill and Tarai, surrounded by India in the East,
3As constitution sets the rules of formation of all political and economic institutions it is obvious
that no long term decisions can be taken until the constitution is implemented. The 12 point
agreement for the complete restoration of democracy in Nepal signed in November 2005 by three
major parties have not yet been fullled. Political parties were united to eliminate monarchy but
they have not agreed to share the political power. Why has this power game been proven so tense
and fruitless so far? Expectations of the people have been forgotten and this long phase of transition
has been very painful. What was the cause of this? While KP Bhattarai, the PM of the interim
government after the restoration of multi-party democracy with a constitutional monarchy on 16
April, 1990 was able to forge a consensus for a new constitution within a year terminating the
partyless Panchayat system that resulted from the royal coup of the parliamentary system initiated
in 1960, why did it take so long for political parties to come into such an agreement? Was it because
Maoists did not exist at that time? How much this is due to changes in the fundamentals and how
much of it is due to ine¢ ciency of the politicians? Most think igo-centric self-interest orientated
politicians were the major cause of such ine¢ ciency. They lack enough lessons on honesty and
integrity.
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South and West and bordering to the Tibetan autonomous regions of China in the
North. Historically it is said that Nepal is a country of 4 classes and 36 ethnic groups.
This creates heterogeneity among population; for instance languages and cultural sys-
tem are di¤erent among Rai, Limbu Sherpa, Bahun, Chhetri, Newar, Yadav, Tharu,
Khas, Magar, Gurung and other ethnic groups. Then villages and valleys vary by
geographic locations. Mountains, Hills and Tarai have di¤erent natural set-ups and
di¤erent requirements. Then each of the political parties have created a clientele
in each of these groups. No single solution applies to all these elements when the
political and economic interests are di¤erent. Given this situation the constitution
has set up a broad framework which is exible enough to accommodate the need of
each of these groups. Wasting time on the basis of pure ideological and unrealistic
paradigms does not lead to any amicable and e¤ective solution. Unfortunately that is
what happens in practice. Why have not Buddhas teaching of peaceful coexistence
been applied at the national level? A solution in such circumstances should build on
good things from each party or groups. Some compromise is essential on the basis of
coexistence and development of all within the given constraints. A commitment to
create good institutions based on logics and rationality and more scientic methods
of decision making for the growth and development of the whole nation only can
bring one to such outcome.
2.2 Beliefs: What do they care about?
There are N parties in the country indexed by i = 1; ::::; N . Each party wants to
represent a given constituency appealing voters to its own manifesto promises such
as double digit growth, free up to secondary education, student loans for higher ed-
ucation, safe drinking water, health services, ecological and environment protection,
investment, capital accumulation, job creation, development of cultural and social
harmony, development of tourism, creation of basic infrastructure for growth includ-
ing uninterrupted electricity, opportunities for credit, productivity and marketing.
Each party i is interested in its own pay-o¤ xi (e.g the number of ministries it should
have under its command) which it computes using a payo¤ function Ui that depend
on strategies available to players and its information set about the reactions of other
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players:
xi = Ui (S1; S2; ::::; Sn; a0; a1; a2; ::::; an) (1)
where S1; S2; ::::; Sn denote the strategies available to players, a0 is common knowl-
edge, and a1; a2; ::::; an denote the unknown characteristic of player i. Each player
knows which strategy is better for it given the strategy space of other players but
they have less information about the reactions of other players, aj. They make some
subjective estimates about others actions while calculating its payo¤ xi. This value
gives their reservation or threat point in the bargaining. The agreement takes place
when actual bargaining and negotiation ends up giving zi and when this value is
greater than or equal to what the party i had expected, zi = xi. Negotiation breaks
down whenever zi 6 xi.
Parties need to learn from each other to create a more realistic beliefs (bj) about
other players replacing unknown characteristics (a0; a1; a2; ::::; an) by more accurate
representation parameters (b0; b1; b2; ::::; bn)
xi = Li (S1; S2; ::::; Sn; b0; b1; b2; ::::; bn) (2)
Beliefs on these parameters could be formed on the basis of history, principles and
values of parties and key personalities of the party and studying their relations to
other players. Convergence on beliefs among all parties occurs when they understand
and trust each other. This gives credibility to the outcome of the game. Equilibrium
in such case is more certain and e¢ cient and generates greater payo¤ for parties and
welfare of the country.
max
1X
t=0
txi;t =
1X
t=0

tLi (S1;t; S2;t; ::::; Sn;t; b0;t; b1;t; b2;t; ::::; bn;t)
	
(3)
The evolution of the belief system should be consistent to a dynamic general
equilibrium model that shows trade-o¤s between growth and redistribution in Nepal
objectively based on its structure of consumption, production, trade and the public
policy. This model need to be modied for the evolving economy within the federal
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democratic system Nepal. No such e¤ort has been carried out before.
3 Dynamic model
Let us consider a model of Nepal with urban and rural households located in various
economic regions of this country. Each of them allocate their life time income to
maximize utility by choosing an optimal path of consumption and saving. These
households provide factor services to producers of goods and services, who sell prod-
ucts both in domestic and foreign markets. The capital stock, determined overtime
by the volume of savings and investment, complements labor input. In central case,
we assume that labor force grows exogenously. Output expands along with increase
in labor and capital inputs, its level is consistent with the demand of consumers,
investors, the government and foreign sectors.
3.1 Mechanism for Poverty Alleviation
 There are three players in the poverty game -poor, rich and government; each
has three strategies available to it to play, s, l, and k , cooperation, indi¤erence
and non cooperation.
 The outcome of the game is the strategy contingent income for poor and rich,
ypt (s; l; k) and y
R
t (s; l; k) with the probability of being in particular state like
this is given by pt (s; l; k) and 
R
t (s; l; k) respectively and tax and transfer
proles associated to them.
 The state-space of the game rises exponentially with the length of time period
t.
 The objective of these rich and poor households is to maximize the expected
utility that is assumed to be concave in income.
 The government can inuence this outcome by choices of taxes and transfers
that can be liberal, normal or conservative.
Proposition 1: The state contingent expected money metric utility of poor is
less than that of rich, which can be expressed as:
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where pt (s; l; k) gives the probability of choosing one of strategies by poor given
that the rich and the government has chosen l and k strategies. Utility is derived
from income as given by u (ypt (s; l; k)) and 
p
t =
1
(1+rpt )
is the discount factors for poor
and Rt =
1
(1+rRt )
the discount factor for rich.
Proposition 2: Transfer raises money metric expected utility of poor and re-
duces the utility of rich.
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Proposition 3: Incentive compatibility requires that
sX
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and
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Proposition 4: Growth requires that income of both poor and rich are rising
over time:
T pt (s; l; k) < T
p
t+1(s; l; k) < T
p
t+1(s; l; k) < ::::: < T
p
t+T (s; l; k) (8)
Y Rt (s; l; k) < Y
R
t+1(s; l; k) < Y
R
t+1(s; l; k) < ::::: < Y
R
t+T (s; l; k) (9)
Proposition 5: Termination of poverty requires that every poor individual (Y pt )
has at least the level of income equal to the poverty line determined by the society.
When the poverty line is dened by one half of the average income (Y ht ) this can be
stated as:
Y pt (s; l; k) >
1
2
 
1
N
NX
h=1
Y ht (s; l; k)
!
(10)
Above ve propositions comprehensively incorporate all possible scenarios in the
poverty game mentioned above. Propositions 2-5 present optimistic scenarios for a
chosen horizon T .
Mechanism for Poverty Alleviation: Tests
 Testing above propositions in a real world situation is very challenging exercise.
 It requires modelling of the entire state space of the economy.
 Moreover in real situation consumers and producers are heterogeneous regard-
ing their preferences, endowments and technology and economy is more com-
plicated than depicted in the model above.
 In essence it requires a general equilibrium set up of an economy where poor
and rich households participate freely in economic activities taking their share
of income received from supplying labour and capital inputs that are a¤ected
by tax and transfer system as illustrated in the next section.
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3.2 ConsumersIntertemporal Problem
In the model representative households located in urban and rural areas of the econ-
omy allocate lifetime income to maximize utility over an innite horizon; i.e.
max
1X
t=0
tU(Cht ) (11)
where  is the the discount factor, and it depends on the rate of time preference;
Cht is composite consumption; U is a time separable utility function. We choose a
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) CES utility function to represent U in (1).4
 = 1, U(Ct) = logCt.
U(Cht ) =
 
Cht
1    1
1   (12)
here 1= measures the elasticity of substitution between the present and future
consumption. The smaller is  the more slowly marginal utility falls as consumption
rises, so households are more willing to allow changes in consumption over time.
Thus smaller  implies higher elasticity of substitution between current and future
consumption or the higher degree of consumption smoothing and substitution over
time.
Each type of households faces an inter-temporal budget constraint which implies
that its the present value of consumption cannot exceed its present value of life time
income (wealth).
1X
t=0
R 1t PtC
h
t = WH
h (13)
where, R 1t =
t 1

s=0
1
1+rs
is a discount factor to convert future expenses in the
present value terms; rs represents the real interest on nancial assets; Pt is vectors
of relative prices, and Ct is composite consumption goods, which is composed of
sectoral consumption goods,
Ct = i = 1nC
hi
i;t (14)
where hi gives the share of spending on good i by household h. WHh is the life
time wealth of household h and is dened as:
4When
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WHh =
Jh0
1 + rc0
+
Jh1
(1 + rc0) (1 + r
c
1)
+ ::+
Jh2
hs (1 + r
c
0)
+ ::: =
1X
t=0
R 1t J
h
t (15)
where Jht is disposable household income in period t. It includes labor and capital
income plus transfers.
We combine equation (1) to (4) to form Lagrangian of consumers the inter-
temporal allocation problem in (5).
=h =
1X
t=0
(
1
1 + 
)t(
Cht
1    1
1   ) + :[
1X
t=0
R 1t PtC
h
t  WHht ] (16)
Here,  is the shadow price of income in terms of present value of utility, and  in
(1) is replaced by 1
1+
,where  is the rate of time preference. We derive consumption
function by taking rst order condition on (5):
Ct+1
Ct
=

1 + rt
1 + 

Pt
Pt+1
 1

(17)
or using a steady state assumption on the growth rate
Ct+1 =

1 + rt
1 + 

Pt
Pt+1
 1

C0(1 + g)
t 1 (18)
Thus the consumption level at time t, in the steady state, is a function of growth
rate, the rate of interest and intertemporal prices of commodities. Consistency of
the intertemporal budget constraint implies that:X
t
R 1t [C0 + 
1C0 + 
2C0 + :::::] =WH
h (19)
where

t = [
tR 1t
Pt
P0
]
1
 (20)
Economy wide savings is total of household savings, Sht , which in turn is the portion
of income not consumed:
St =
X
h
Sht =
X
h
Jht  
X
h
Cht (21)
23
The consumption saving decisions are two sides of the same coin. Once we know
the level consumption we also know the level of savings. Saving like consumption is
inuenced by the rate of interest prevailing in the economy and the time preference of
individuals. The e¢ ciency in the nancial system can contribute to rise in the level
of saving, depending upon the value of , by inuencing the decision between the
current and future consumption and reducing the wedge between the cost of capital
to investors and gains received by the savers.
Savings of households are intermediated through the nancial institutions to in-
vestors, who use those savings to purchase investment goods from di¤erent sectors.
Like consumers investors in each of n production sectors solve an intertemporal prot
maximization problem. They combine goods produced in a set of n sectors to deliver
an unit of investment in sector j. Therefore, the unit cost of investment in sector j is
a weighted average of the prices of components of sector n goods used for investment
purpose. One unit of investment at period t produces once unit of capital stock in
period t+ 1:
IY
j;t
= P kj;t+1  
X
i
Pi;ta
I
i;j  0 (22)
Here
QI
j;t is prot from one unit of investment at period t, P
k
j;t+1 is the price of
capital in period t + 1, and aIi;j is the investment coe¢ cient matrix. One unit of
capital at the start of period 1 generates a rate of return ( rkj;t) today and delivers
1   unit at the start of the subsequent period. The arbitrage condition in capital
accumulation implies that:
kY
j;t
= (1  )P kj;t+1 + rkj;t   P kj;t  0 (23)
Entering capital (K0) stock is transferred into initial capital stock for the various
sectors, Ki;0, according to a xed coe¢ cient transformation process. Once the initial
capital is allocated among di¤erent sectors, Ki;t , the law of motion of capital in a
sector is explained by the following equation.
Kj;t+1 = Ij;t + (1  K)Kj;t (24)
where,
Ij;t =
JX
j=1
aIi;jIj;t (25)
24
Net investment demand, Ii;t , in each sector is the sum of investment by origin.
The relationship given by aI
i;j;t
is called capital coe¢ cient matrix of the economy.
We assume that in the terminal period the investment in each sector grows at the
rate of the population so that economy can continue along the steady state growth
path even after the terminal period as given by the following equation.
Ij;t = (g + K;j)Kj;t (26)
g = growth rate of the economy, which equals the growth rate of the labor force
in terms of e¢ ciency units, and K = rate of depreciation.
Holding aggregate stock of capital xed to the savings of households in the begin-
ning of each period, the objective of rms in jth sector of the economy is to maximize
the present value of prot subject to the constraints of production technology. Zero
prot for sector j written in dual form in terms of composite prices of commodities
and inputs is the following form (See appendix for details):
yj;t = [(
x
jPX
1+
j;t + (1  xj )PD1+j;t )]
1
1+   vjPV vj   (1  vj )
X
j
ai;jPi;t  0 (27)
The exact meaning of the symbols of the above prot function are following:
yj;t unit prot of activity in sector j
PXj;t price of exports
PDj;t price of domestic sales
PV vj price of value added per unit of output in activity j
Pi;t price of nal goods used as intermediate goods
xj share parameter for exports in total production
vj share of costs paid to labor and capital
ai;j input output coe¢ cients.
This equation (27) is a unit prot function. The prot of operating these rms
are given by the di¤erences between the revenue from sales and the cost of supply.
The unit revenue function is constant elasticity transformation (CET) composite of
unit price of domestic sales and unit price of exports. The unit costs are divided
between value-added, i.e. payments to labor and capital, and the unit intermediate
input costs. In this model, the gross output in each sector is given by a nested
production function between the value added and the intermediate inputs.
Yj;t = min(Vj;t; ai;jYj;t) (28)
Where Yj;t is the output of sector j in period t, Vj;t is the value added part and
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ai;j is the intermediate inputs per unit of gross output produced in sector j.
We use Shephards lemma to derive the demand for labor and capital from (27).
The demand for labor is:
Lj;t = Yj;t
@
QV
j;t
@PVj;t
@PVj;t
@PLj;t
(29)
where Lj;tis a composite of rural (unskilled) and urban (skilled) labor. Equi-
librium in the labor market requires that demand for labor be equal to supply of
labor: X
j
Lj;t
@L
@PLLCt
 Lt (30)
Ltin the above equations is a composite of urban and rural labor. The ratio of urban
to rural labor employed by rms mainly depends upon the ratio of urban to rural
wage rates.
The demand for capital in sector j, again by Shephards lemma is given by:
Kj;t = Yj;t
@
QV
j;t
@PVj;t
@PVj;t
@PKj;t
(31)
where Yj;t is activity level; PKj;tis price of capital PVj;t is price of value added.
In equilibrium the demand for capital is equal to its supply:X
j
Kj;t = Kt (32)
Kt is the aggregate capital stock in the economy, which grows according to the
low of motion of capital stock as given by equation 13.
P
j
Kj;tis the total demand
for capital by various sectors of the economy.
When an economy is repressed, the arbitrage condition implied by (9)
P kj;t+1 =
JX
j=1
Pj;ta
I
i;j (33)
does not exactly hold. There is additional distortionary cost  j;t on top of the
cost of materials required for per unit investment. The overall cost of investment is
rather given by:
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P kj;t+1 = (1 +  j;t)
JX
j=1
Pj;ta
I
i;j (34)
where  j;t = per unit wedge between the return to saving and the cost of invest-
ment. P kj;t+1 = present value price of sector j capital at the beginning of next period;
P = present value price of sector i commodity at period t.
In repressionary situation certain portion of saving dissipates in the process of
nancial intermediation. Therefore the total investment in the economy less than
the total savings i.e. the amount of savings net of intermediation costs. Moreover,
additional resources may be available by liquidating the real unproductive assets
(RA) of the households and rms.
c(St  RAt) = It (35)
Here c is the proportion of saving available for investment purpose, or, 1   c being
the cost of nancial intermediation. In this model cost of nancial intermediation is
represented by the distortionary cost of repression.
3.3 Calibration to a Steady State
In the steady state all sectors of the economy grow at the same rate, g. The bench
mark rate of return is calibrated assuming the non-distorted economy being in the
steady state in the base year. Calibration of dynamic component follows the re-
lationship between the current and future prices of capital and investment goods.
Specically, investment produces one unit of capital stock in period 2 ( P k2 ) from
one unit of output in the period one, P I1 . The present value of one unit of capital in
period 2 is equal to (1  r)P k1 .
P I1 = 1 = P
k
2 = (1 + r)P
k
1 =) P k1 =
1
1  rP
k
2 (36)
Here 1  r is the discount rate between two periods, and is approximation to 1
1+r
P kt+1
P kt
= (1  r) (37)
One unit of capital at the beginning of period one earns a rate of return today, rk1and
delivers 1   unit of capital for the start of the next period.
P k1 = r
k
1 + (1  ) (1  r)P k2 (38)
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This relationship applies to all other periods included in the model. Using base
year prices equal to 1 to P k2 and P
k
1 by using relationship between P
k
2 and P
k
1 we get:
1
1  r = r
k
1 + (1  ) (39)
which gives the cost of capital to be equal to the rate interest plus the rate of
depreciation:
rk1 =
r
1  r +  (40)
. The base-year social accounting matrix (SAM) contains information on capital
income V1 and it is related to rate of return and capital stock, V1 = rk1K1. Now
substituting for rk1 between the steady state interest rate r and the parameters of the
model:
K1 =
V1
r
1 r + 
(41)
Then substituting this value of K1 in I1 function the relationship between the
investment and capital earning component of value added may be expressed as:
I1
V1
=
g + 
r
1 r + 
(42)
If the ratio of investment and capital earning ( I1
V1
= 1) is equal to one then
g = r
1 r or r =
g
1+g
. When I1
V1
6= 1, then the key parameter to calibrate is the rate
of depreciation, which can be calculated using the relationship between the interest
rate, growth rate, depreciation and earning of capital as following :
j = g
Vj
Ij   Vj  
r
1  r
Ij
Ij   Vj (43)
In a repressionary regime the cost of capital is distorted by a repressionary com-
ponent of intermediation,  j. This can be expressed as:
rk1 =
rk1
1   j (44)
28
here rk1 is actual cost of capital, r
k
j is rate of interest in steady state, and  j is
distortionary element in the nancial market. The price of capital becomes
P k1 = r
k
1 (1   j) + (1  ) (1  r)P k2 (45)
or the cost of capital
rk1 =
1
1   j

r
1  r + 

(46)
Now adjusting (26) to take account of distortions in the capital market :
I1
V1
=
g + 
r
1 r + 
(1   j) (47)
or
 j = 1 
rkj
 + g
Ij
Vj
(48)
Thus the spread between the true cost of capital rkj and the actual cost of capital
rk1 depends upon the ratio of investment to capital and ratio of natural rate of interest
to depreciation plus the growth rate of the economy.
3.4 Government Budget and BOP Closures
In the core part of the model the governments budget is balanced in every period,
and, therefore government is not involved in intertemporal savings. This essentially
implies all government expenditure is basically the government consumption.
The sources of revenue for the government are taxes on value added5, tari¤s
on imports, sales taxes, income taxes and capital taxes. Lump sum income taxes
are collected from total household income, and such income taxes are assumed to
grow at the rate of population growth rate. In addition there are other sources of
government revenue such as export taxes, taxes on tourism, revenue generated from
import-licensing and refund of excise taxes from India.
Government transfers its revenues to households and rms in the form of con-
5From the scal year 1996/97 the government is adopting a value-added tax (VAT) system
to replace sales and excise taxes imposed on consumers and producers. Given the self-enforcing
mechanism of VAT against other indirect taxes are believed to reduce leakage of tax-revenues,
though its implementation seem challenging if one considers illiteracy of 67 percent of population in
the country. In ideal conditions revenue generated from VAT and taxes on the nal product would
be the same.
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sumption and production subsidies, and it also serves domestic and foreign debt. In
the core part of the model we assume all sorts of government non-transfer spending
to public consumption.
This is an open economy model. We follow standard Armington specication of
international trade in this model. For each tradable sectors constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) function denes relation between exports and domestic sup-
ply, and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function explains relation between
domestic supply and imports in forming a composite good that goes to the utility
function of the households. We use two level nests in trade to take account of dif-
ferent natures of trade relations between India and rest of the world (ROW). More
detailed discussion of trade specication is available elsewhere (see Bhattarai (1997,
2007, 2017) and also the appendix of this paper).
We consider two rules of BOP closure. In the rst case no foreign borrowing is
allowed; imports need to be paid by exports6 :In the second case intertemporal bor-
rowing and lending is permitted. It is presented in the form of CAPFLOW scenario
in the next section:The elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported
products in consumption and the elasticity of transformation between domestic sales
and foreign sales are taken based on sensitivity analyses.
Finally, the market clearing condition for goods market is given by:
Aj;t = Cj;t +
12X
j=1
ai;jYj;t +Gj;t +
12X
j=1
aIi;jIj;t +DSTj;t + TDj;t (49)
here Aj;tis total supply in the economy in a sector j should be equal to sum
of various components of demand as given on the right hand side, i.e. the con-
sumption of households: Cj;t =
P
h
Cj;h;t, intermediate demands:
12P
j=1
ai;jYj;t; , gov-
ernment demand: Gj;t, investment demand: Ij;t =
P
j
ai;jIj;;t, inventory demand:
DSTj;t = DSTRj;t  Yj;t, and demand by tourists: TDst ; for simplicity we assume
that demand by tourists grows at the rate of growth of the economy.
3.5 Denition of a competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences of prices of composite commodities,
Pi;t; prices of domestic goods sold in domestic markets, PDi;t; prices of exported
commodities, PXi;t ; prices of capital goods , P kj;t ; prices of terminal capital ,
6 . In the model number of sectors trading with placecountry-regionIndia and rest of the world
are seven and eight respectively.
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PTKj;t; wage rates for each categories of labor, wh;t; prices of government services,
PGt; prices of provisions for tourism, PTt; value of transfers to the households,
PRt; prices of consumption, PUt; welfare index, PWt; rental rate of capital for each
sector, rk1 : R+ !R, and sequences of gross output, Yi;t; total supply of commodities,
Ai;t; sectoral capital stock, Ki;t; sectoral investment, Ii;t; exports, Xi;t; government
services, GOVt; level of household utility from consumption, Ut; and total welfare,
W such that given these prices and commodities
1. households solve intertemporal utility maximization problems subject to life
time income constraints,
2. investors solve intertemporal prot maximization problem subject to arbitrage
conditions in capital markets
3. producers solve their prot maximization problem subject to technology and
resource constraints
4. markets for goods and services, labor , capital clear
5. government account constraints are satised,
6. balance of payments condition is fullled
7. nancial markets are in equilibrium
In this equilibrium, consumers have perfect foresight, capital accumulation is
consistent with households optimization, income and expenditure balance over the
life period. An agent is doing the best he can in light of actions taken by others
and actions taken together are technically feasible. This ensures the compatibility
of plans of individuals or correspondence between consumerspreferences and rms
technology.
There are mainly two limitations of this model. First, analytical solution of this
model is very complex and unrewarding. We rely on numerical methods that generate
a set of relative prices consistent with the equilibrium. Absolute prices do not matter
in general equilibrium models, it generates the same equilibrium even if all prices are
multiplied by a constant. For analyses of model results we basically compare ratios
of prices in terms of a numeraire in benchmark and counter-factual scenarios, not
the absolute di¤erences in prices.
Second, the model presented here does not contain any adjustment costs or penalties.
The role of dynamics in such a model is not to show the pattern of adjustment, but
to track the prices of commodities with a multiperiod character, e.g. the capital
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stock. The model is suitable to study the impact of a certain policy that changes the
steady state of the model and thus the growth and welfare of the households over a
model horizon.
In spite of these limitations the model is capable of generating results that are
interesting from a point of view of a policy maker. We use a welfare index as the
criterion for making the best policy choice from the various options available to a
policy maker.
3.6 Measure of Welfare
General equilibrium solutions are used to compute equivalent or compensating vari-
ations in consumer welfare from given changes in policy regimes. In this model the
overall welfare is given by sum of utility over periods measured in terms of prices of
composite consumption.
UW h =
1X
t
PUht U
h
t (50)
Here UW h is a measure of welfare to household h for the period of model horizon,
PUht is the price of composite consumption in period t, and U
h
t is the utility to a
household from consumption of goods and services in the economy.
We use welfare measures in order to quantify the impacts of various policy measures.
A policy experiment that has greater value of UW h is more desirable than the one
with lower one.
4 Interactions of model with beliefs
The process of negotiations among various parties should be based objectively in an
economic model as above as it is possible to compute the optimal level of saving,
investment, capital formation and growth objectively in such a set up. There is little
room for illusions, misunderstanding and distrust when the negotiations are based
on such models:
max
1X
t=0
txi;t =
1X
t=0

tLi (S1;t; S2;t; ::::; Sn;t; b0;t; b1;t; b2;t; ::::; bn;t;Mt)
	
(51)
5 Parliament and Government 2018
Constitution of the federal republic of Nepal 2015 has set two criteria for a national
party. It should win at least one FPTP seat of 165 constituencies and it should get at
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NCP NC FSFN RJPN Others Vacant Total FPTP PR
House of Representatives 174 63 16 17 5 0 275 165 110
Upper House 42 13 2 2 0 0 59
Province 1 66 21 3 0 3 0 93 56 37
Province 2 32 19 29 25 2 0 107 64 43
Province 3 81 21 0 0 8 0 110 66 44
Gandaki 39 15 0 0 6 0 60 36 24
Province 5 61 19 5 1 1 0 87 52 35
Karnali 32 6 0 0 1 1 40 24 16
Sudurpashchim 39 12 0 2 0 0 53 32 21
Total 566 189 55 47 26 1 884 495 330
FPTP Proportional
Votes % Seats Votes % Seats Total
CPN (Unified Marxist–Leninist) 3082277 30.68 80 3173494 33.25 41 121
Nepali Congress 3590793 35.75 23 3128389 32.78 40 63
CPN (Maoist Centre) 1510760 15.03 36 1303721 13.66 17 53
Rastriya Janata Party Nepal 458409 4.56 11 472254 4.95 6 17
Federal Socialist Forum, Nepal 527924 5.26 10 470201 4.93 6 16
Bibeksheel Sajha Party 96233 0.96 0 212366 2.22 0 0
Rastriya Prajatantra Party 118318 1.18 1 196782 2.06 0 1
Rastriya Prajatantra Party (Democratic) 123797 1.23 0 88377 0.93 0 0
Naya Shakti Party, Nepal 84037 0.84 1 81837 0.86 0 1
Rastriya Janamorcha 1 62133 0.65 0 1
Nepal Workers Peasants Party 1 56141 0.59 0
Total 165 9544744 100 110 275
least 3 percent of the popular vote. Nearly 100 party contested the election but only
ve of them could meet these two criteria; CPN-UML, NC, CPN-Maoists, Rastriya
Janata Party Nepal and Federal Socialist Forum Nepal.
Election was contested vigorously. It would have been a hung parliament if the
UML and CPN-Maoists had not aligned. Communist alliance was formed and they
were able to earn nearly 64 percent of votes in the parliament (44% of NCP and 19.%
of the CPN-Maoist followed by 22.9% of the NC). Popular vote however had placed
NC (32.8%) right behind the UML. More important thing was the unity between the
UML and the Maoist that created a Nepal Communist Party (NCP). With mergers
of communists in one party and the NC on the other was considered a welcome
development for Nepal. NCP clearly had an absolute majority and axpectations of
people for economic development and growth were quite high from this government.
The NCP with 174 out of 165 seats in the Upper house and party with majority
in six out of seven provinces emerged as a dominant party in Nepal after the 2017
election. It had 566 out of 884 putting central and provicial constituencies. FSFN
and RJPN hold just a simple majority in Province 2.
Why was the NCP so popular this time? Besides radical promises in the mani-
festo that included a double digit growth, rapid development of road and waterways
and railways, free education up to the secondary level , free primary care, tourism
to attract 2 million tourists, raising the life expectancy, urbanization and electricity,
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most people believe that anti-India stance of the communists during 2015-16 unde-
clared embargo by India made them popular among people this time. NC was not
as vocal as the UML to protest India at that time.
5.1 Constituent Assemblies 2013 and 2008 of Nepal
People are principals and MPs are their agents in the principal agent game. When
the CAN-I, with Maoists as the major party as shown in Table 2, dissolved without
promulgating a constitution of Nepal on May 28, 2012 people changed their beliefs
about the true intention and commitment of the CPN (Maoists) towards development
and their ability to promulgate a constitution of Nepal. They rened their beliefs
about the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML and other Tarai based parties. This
change is reected in the structure of the CAN-II that was elected on November 19,
2013, as shown in Table 3. Still CAN-II also was as hung as CAN-I as before but
the share of the Nepali Congress increased to 33.9 from 19.3 percent and that of
CPN-UML increased to 30.4 from 18.0 percent. The share of CPN (M) reduced to
14 from 38.1 percent. The CPN (M) became weak and is no longer in a position
of dreaming a totalitarian system in Nepal. After the constitution was promulgated
on 20 September 2015, the CAN-II became a regular parliament of Nepal to operate
till the general election was held under this new constitution. It is irony that the
NC that struggled so much in promulgating the constitution was rooted out of the
power by a coalition of communist parties, CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist in the 2017
election. NCP not only formed the cabinet, but also elected their member to the
president and deputy presidents of Nepal as well as to speaker and deputy speakers
of the parliament. The NC is reorganizing now to ght back the share of power that
it lost still as the main political party in the country at least to as shown in Table 3.
Political events after the promulgation of the new constituion shows that political
leaders of Nepal still seem to be confused in understanding the basic facts that the
gains from the commitment and cooperation should be much larger than of nonco-
operation to form coalition or in realising that the benets of dynamic optimisation
are far greater than zero sum game being played at the moment. It is important to
rethink about the true and realistic social welfare function such as W (Y; S) where
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Table 2: Members of First Constituent Assembly by Political Parties in Nepal
Total Maoist NC UML MPRF TMLP Others
Total 601 229 116 108 53 21 74
FPTP 240 120 38 33 29 9 11
Proportional 335 100 73 70 22 11 59
Nomination 26 9 5 5 2 1 5
Percentage 100% 38.1% 19.3% 18.0% 8.8% 3.5% 12.3%
Source: Constituent Assembly of Nepal (CAN-I, 2008-2012).
Table 3: Members of Second Constituent Assembly by Political Parties in Nepal
Total NC UML Maoist MPRF RPP Others
Total 601 204 183 84 15 11 103
FPTP 240 105 91 26 4 0 14
Proportional 335 91 84 54 10 10 86
Nomination 26 8 8 4 (0)1 1 (0)3
Percentage 100% 33.9% 30.4% 14.0% 2.5% 1.8% 17.1%
Source: Constituent Assembly of Nepal (CAN-II, 2013-2017).
Y denotes the level of aggregate economic activities and its growth rates and S the
stability of the system. Resources wasted in the process of unsuccessful coalition
formation deter the economy from achieving the more e¢ cient and Pareto optimal
solution. For instance, Nepal has not been able to utilise the resources pledged for
the restoration and rehabilitation activities after the major earthquake. This was
one of the reason why India reduced the aid to Nepal by 40 percent in it 2016 budget
in March 2016. Reinvigorate the spirits of April 2006 Revolution. It is important
to think why Nepals per capita income is one third of India and about 12 percent
of China though it had similar per capita income with them till 1980. Political in-
stability in the last two decades has been very costly to Nepal. These could have
been decades of spectacular growth but turned into the decades of disaster. There
cannot be bigger irony than this in the context of Nepal and cooperative strategies
of each political party is the only way to sort out this problem. Credibility, respect
and commitment only can make this happen. There is more need for this now than
before.
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6 Conclusion
Nepal made signicant progress in removing monarchy and terrors of Maoists in the
last decade. It however lacks a stable solution of speedier economic growth and devel-
opment as the major political parties are still struggling to institutionalize the new
political framework set up by the new constitution of Nepal that was promulgated
by the Constitution Assembly of Nepal (CAN-II ) for the federal democratic republic
of Nepal on 20 September 2015. Madesh based parties did not accept the new con-
stitution, this caused an undeclared embargo by India. Nepalese economy crippled
by the mighty earthquake of April 2015 got further paralyzed due to this blockage.
This has slowed down the process of demarcation of provinces, election of provincial
assemblies and government, election of the national government. Setting up strat-
egy for growth and development in Nepal with the multiparty structure with focus
on broader objectives of national development, alleviation of poverty and speedier
economic growth and design of programmes suitable to multi-ethnic, multi-climatic
and multi-cultural and multi-linguistic inclusive frameworks would be possible only
when the new set up is complete. Nepal should stick to a dynamic model of growth
and development for a decentralized economy to update on beliefs that can transform
the nation improving wellbeing of all people in Nepal. After the constitution was
promulgated on 20 September 2015, the CAN-II became a parliament of Nepal. It
is irony that the NC that struggled so much in promulgating the constitution was
rooted out of the power by NCP, a coalition of former CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist,
which not only formed the cabinet, but also elected their member to the president
and deputy presidents of Nepal as well as to speaker and deputy speakers in the
parliament.
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